عنوان مقاله [English]
"Intentionality" is a central concept in the philosophy of mind and contemporary philosophical discourses. How it is possible and also how to determine the mental content are among the important issues in this regard, the explanation of which differs based on different philosophical principles. For this reason, this article explains intentionality from the perspective of Mohammad Hoseyn Tabatabai and the contemporary philosophers namely Fodor, Dartsky, and Millikan. Philosophers, who believe in the causal and ultimate theories of content in explaining intentionality, try to naturalize intentionality and mental content based on physicalism in their opinion. The author believes that according to Tabatabai's philosophical foundations, a new answer can be found to the problem of the possibility of intentionality and determination of mental content. This answer, which is a kind of causal statement, is not possible without denying the materialist view of science. In this article, we have shown that the proposed response derived from Tabatabai's principles can be reconstructed by a kind of integration with content theories, and it can be said that the mechanisms explained by content theories are material processes that play a preparatory role in determining content and intentionality.