نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
مربی گروه علمی مطالعات اسلامی، جامعة المصطفی، قم، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Intentionality is one of the main characteristics of mental states based on which mental states are related to objects. Hence, one of the issues of the philosophy of mind is to explain this feature. The present article examines two relevant aspects of this subject, namely, the possibility of intentionality and how to determine mental content. In the first aspect, we explain the possibility of intentionality based on the doctrine of physicalism, and then we talk about how the mental content is determined, which is the semantic feature of intentionality. According to causal theories, its content and method of referring to the outside of the mind and brain are determined by the causal cause or circumstances of its creator. Thus, mental representations i.e. our thoughts have meaning in terms of the causal relationship between them and the part of the world they refer to, and in this way, a natural and physical explanation can be given in terms of intent and content. In this article, after stating the foundations of this theory, namely intentional realism, and naturalism, we discuss and evaluate the two main interpretations of causal theories, namely Fodor's asymmetric dependence and Dal Dretske's semantics. The most important drawbacks of causal theories in both interpretations are the inability to explain the content and meaning of logical and philosophical concepts, as well as non-existent concepts, systematic error, and future beliefs. Fodor's interpretation is ambiguous in the delivery of information, and Dretske's interpretation of the analogy between our knowledge and beliefs with the causal circumstances that give rise to them is problematic. Consequently, both interpretations are incomplete.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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